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Abstract 
In ca~*riagt? ofgoods bysea, usuallyparlres involvedin the transaction 
are composed of a seller of goo& (exporter), buyer (imgorter), 
forwarding agent, ship owner, carrfer and port authority When 
the contract of can-iage is entered, basically it involves the shipper 
of goods (not necessarily ihe seller of goods) and the s h e  owner. 
The question normally arises are as follows Who is the right or 
proper person to b1,ing action should a breach of contract occur?, 
Ifthe goody da~nage or lass in tramif, who s/tould claim damages 
fo7" the loss or dmage?; What are the laws applicabl m Mdaysia 
after 19921 All t k s e  questions become very important due to the 
changes of law in England in 1992, relating to the 7,ight of suit. 
This paper attewrpls to answer all the above questions bared on The 
Civil Law Acf 1956 (The Malaysian Acf), The Bill of Lading Act 
1855 (The EnglishAcf) and The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 
(The English Act), 
Introduction 
The English Carriage of Goods Act 1992 was passed to remedy 
a number of rights of suit problems under the Bills of Lading Act 
1855. These problems stem frmn the provision of section 1 of 1855 
Act which effecting atransfer of shipper" sights vis-a-vis the m i e r  
to the consignee of goods or indorsee of the bill of ladingto whom 
propem in the goods passed upon or by reason of the consignment 
or indorsement. Before discussing the relevant provisions of the 
new 1992Act, the presenter will firstly discuss the proble~ns arising 
out of the section 1 of the 1855 Act and its solutions then followed 
by discussions of the 1992 Act, 
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The Bills of Lading Act 1855 
(1) Section 1 of the 1855 Act 
Section I of 1855 Act is not effectively drafted to achieve its 
purpose, perhaps because the law relating to bills of lading was in 
its infancy in 1855, or perhaps simply because of inaccuracy on 
the part of the legislature? This section was intended to obviate the 
inconvenience of the decision of Thonzpson v. Doinin.?: whereas 
since Lickbarrow v. Mason4 indorsement and delivery of a bill of 
ladimg could transfer property in goods, the transfer nevertheless did 
not acquire a right to sue (nor could he be sued) in his own name. 
It may be supposed that in 1855 this was relatively recent problem, 
as before the establishment of regular shipping lines, telegraph, 
radio and postal services, the buyer would probably have had to call 
personally at ports of shipment and would himselfhave been shipper 
(usually f.o.b).J By 1855, however, buyers would probably not often 
have needed to be physically present, so it would frequently have 
been more convenient, as today, for sellers to undertake shipment. 
It may be that tbe purpose of the 1855 legislation was to cope with 
the change of practice and therefore to transfer contractual rights 
and obligations to buyer on a fairly general basis, at any rate where 
the transaction was straightforward sale and not, for example, 
indorsement by way of a pledge to a hank6 
(2) Upon or by Reason of Consignment or Indorsement 
It has been commented that "one can only regret the fact that the 
Act linked tlie tmnsfer of contractual rights, and the imposition of 
liabilities, so closely with the passing of property."' 
Though "upon" and "by reason of '  are presumably alternative, even 
so property may rarely so pass: often it passes later than consignment 
or indorsement, and for a different reason. For example, if goods are 
Todd, I19841 3 LMCLQ 476, p. 477. 
9 (1845) 14 M & W 403. 
0787) 5 TR683. 
Todd. op ell, p 477. 
Ibid,p.477. 
' Bs)ydnmkSale of Go& Zd edn., para 1476. 
shipped as part of unascertained bulk cargoef' property cannot p a s  
until delivery at the port of discharge. 
Sometimes payment may not be made until after indorsement, and if 
the seller bas reserved a right of disposal against payment, property 
may pass upon and by reason of payment, rather than consignment 
or indorsement? And it seems that general property can never pass 
:n favour of a bank as pledge.I0 
It is even possible to argue that property never pass by reason of 
consignment or indorsement, but depends always on the intentlon 
of the parties." 
Another difficulty is that the section supposes that contract of 
carriage is contained in the bill of lading. In fact this is often not the 
case, and will certainly not be where the shipper bas chartered the 
vessel or part ofher, in which case the contract will be constituted by 
the charter-party, rather than the bill of Indeed, only "where 
no prior contract has been made by the owners.. .can a bill of lading 
signed by the master be the contractl3 So on a literal interpretation, 
even where there is no time lag, and property therefore passes "upon" 
consignment or indorsement, it is still arguable that the drafting of 
the statute is normally i~apposite.'~ 
Thus Lord Bramwell criticizes that section in general terns in 
Sewell vs Burdick, making the point that no contract is contained in 
the bill of lading, the bill of lading being merely areceiptfor goods 
containing evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage.ls 
In fact, the courts seem to have deviated from as rigid a view as 
that taken by Lord Bramwell. Lord Atkins, for example, in Hairz 
S.S. Co v Tate & Lyle1* thought that the effect of the Act was 
8 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 16. 
Day, Law of i temkonal  T d ,  1981, pp. 46-49,72-77. 
'O An interpretation of Seweliu Bud% p 105. 
" Per Lard Brawell in Swvell v Burdrck p. 105. 
Carver, Carnage by Sea, 13*edn., pam 8. 
" Ibzd, para 89. 
'* Todd np.erl, p 478. 
" Per Lord Bramwell m Swellu Burdrck p 105. 
ld (1936) 41 Corn. Cas 350. pp 356-357. 
that a new contract appears to zpring up between the camer and 
the consignee on the terms of the bill of lading. In the Aliakmon" 
the Act was applied to transfer rights of suit to the consignee when 
property passed upon indorseinent18 and in Tl?e Sevonia Team We 
Act was applied to trawfer liabilities when property passed upon 
con~igtllnent.'~ 
Thus where there is no time lapse between consignment or 
indorsement and the passing of property, the courts do not seem 
to take the point that no contract is originally contained in the bill 
of lading.zo It may be suggested, therefore, that the p l m e  about 
the contract being contained in the bill of lading refers only to 
the statutorily implied contracL leading to the result that actually 
obtained in Le& v W~ardz': the statutorily implied relationship 
batween indorsee and carrier is on the basis only of the terms of t l ~ e  
bills of lading, and is unaffected by any other terins which may have 
formed p a t  ofthe original contract between carrier and ~bipper.~  
Even though Lord Bramwell's views would not appear to have been 
wholly accepted by the courts, a narrow view bas still been argued 
where there is a time lag between consignment and ind~rsement?~ 
Such a view is adopted, for example by Scrutton where he says: 
"If the property an goods passes other thwz upon or by 
reason ofthe consigimenf or indorsement, the righi of 
suit do nofpass to the receiver."zc 
Although this view is slightly wider than Lord Bramwell, yet it 
is still a narrow and liberal interpretation and, if correct, then the 
Act can hardly work where there is a time lapse, it being difficult 
to understand of situations where property passes by reason of 
consignment or i n d o r s e m ~ t ~  but where thae also a xman for a 
" [I9831 1 Lloyd 'shp.  203. 
'a Ibzd, p. 207. 
" [I9831 2 Lloyd's Rep 640, p. 644. 
Todd. op at, p. 479. (less) 20 Q.B.D 475, 
a Todd, 6p nf., p. 479. 
Ibrd., p 4W. 
2 ~ ~ ~ ~ I t a n  on Ck~. tqar t ies  19'hedn. P. 27. 
tiine lapse.25 Consequently the likely intention of the legislature is 
largely defeated.2h 
On the other hand, Caner argues that the section cannot be 
construed literally, precisely because Lord Bramwell's remarks, 
which are ironically relied upon by Scrutton to reach a contradictory 
coiicl~rsion, lead to an On Carver's view that section 
operates whenever property passes to the consignee or fndorsee 
under a contract under ~ 1 1 ~ ~ 1 1  the goods are consigned or in pursuance 
of which the bill of lading is indorsed.28 The fact that the property 
inigl~t pass later than consignment or ~ndorse~nent is on this view 
irrelevant, so long as property eventually passes to the consignee.29 
If correct, this view allows the section to operate to transfer rights 
and liabilities in practically any c.i.f or f0.b contract at any rate 
once tbe goods are ascertained, enabling to pass.30 Todd appears to 
have preferred this view despite its not being literal interpretation of 
the secti0n.3~ 
More recently, however, Carver's wider view was preferred by the 
Court of Appeal in The SUE Ni~I tolas ,~~ referred to by Lloyd J., in 
The Sevonia Tear$ and a wider view at any rate then Scrutton's was 
preferred in The El* In neither case, however, did the point arise 
In Sun Nicholm, Lord Denning M.R., based his decision 
on the nature of the particular bill of lading in the case, and in any 
event took only aprima facie view,?6 while. Roskill L.J., also refused 
to express a final view in an interlocutory appeal.?' In The Elaji the 
consignee was aIso able to sue in tort, so statements on transfer of 
contractual rights were strictly obirer. 
" Todd, op cif,  pp 480-481. 
l6 R e  SmN~cholas [I9761 1 Lloyds's [I9761 Ilep. 8, p 13 pcr Roskill L.1 
" Todd, op nl., 481 
Ibjd, p. 481. 
Ibcd, p. 481. 
" I h ~ d ,  p 481. 
" Ibrd, p. 481. 
' 119761 1 Lloyd's Rep 8. 
'"19831 2 Lloyd's Rep 64 p. 643. 
'* [I9841 1 A11 E.R 205. 
'i Todd, op czI, p 483. 
fli [I9761 I Lloyd'sRep. 8, p. 11. 
' Ibzd, p 13. 
Another situation, where t l~e Act 1855 cannot apply is when a bank 
holds a bill of lading as a pledge. The result of the court's decision 
in Sewell vBu~dick3~ was that a bank in such a position was not 
liable by virtue of the operation of Section 1 to the shipowner for 
freight, the principle in the case being that general property in goods 
did not pass to the pledgee. Nevertheless. "if the pledgee realizes 
the security general property win pass, hut it could hardly be said 
to pass upon or by reason of consign~zer~i or indorsement even the 
view taken by Lloyd J."39 
Further, where parts of unasceiained bulk cargoes are involved. 
Invariably in this situation property will not pass by virtue of a bill 
of lading at all. Further problems could arise if the goods are lost 
after indorsement but before they are ascertained, at least on the 
assumption that it is itnpossible to pass property in goods that no 
longer exi~t.4~ 
A final situation in which difficulties may arise is where property 
passes before, or independently of, consignment or indorsanent. 
This problem arose in The DelfiL4' where the relevant indorse~nent 
took place eleven days after the completion of delivery and were in 
no way instrumental in transferring title. 
(3) Alternatives to Section 1 
(a) Implied Contracts 
Thii approacl~ is based on the argument tllat even though the indorsee 
is not party to the original contract of carriage, nevertheless should 
he present the bill of lading to the carrier and take delivery of his 
portion of the cargo on payment ofthe appropriate freight, a contract 
will be implied on the terms set out in the bill of l a d i n e  
The implied contract on tlie terntrns of the relevant transport document, 
is formed when the canier delivers the goods in exchange for the 
j8 (1884) 10 App Cas. 74. 
" Todd. OD m v 484. 
'* Ihrd, p: 484. 
" [I9901 1 LIoyd's Rep 252. 
Wilson, Cmnoge ofGoods by Sza, 1992, p. 149. 
document, be it a hill of lading,a3 or a delivery ordeP or even a 
guarantee that the bill of lading will he presented in due course? 
This method was adopted in Brandt v. Live~pooL" In that case goods 
(zinc ashes) were shipped damaged, but the shipowner nevertheless 
issued abill of lading stating that they were shipped in apparent good 
order and condition. Subsequently, the cargo had to be unloaded and 
reconditioned, at a cost of £748, and re-shipped on another vessel. 
being forwarded late to its destination 
The bill of lading was indorsed in favour of the plaintiff pledgees 
(a bank) who advanced money on it in good faith. When the second 
vessel arrived at it$ destination, the indoaees presented the bill of 
lading, paid the &eight and (under protest) the sum of £748, which 
the shipowner demanded, and took delivery of the cargo. 
The indorsee bank then sued the shipowner for damages due to delay 
(the general value of the cargo having fallen) and for repayment of 
the £748. As pledgee they had no action based on the 1855 Act. The 
court decided in favour of the indorsee bank and held that by the acts 
of presenting the bill of ladimg, payment of the freight and delivery 
of the cargo a contract was implied between the indorsee and the 
shipowner on the terms of the bill of lading. 
The principle stated by the court is subsequently known as Brandt v 
Liverpool doctrine. The doctrine does not depend on the transfer of 
hill of lading, or on the passing of property. Its operation, however, 
depends to some extent on whetiier the facts support the implication 
of a new contract, but where they do, many ofthe difficulties of the 
1855 Act are avoidedP7 The implication is that where a bill of lading 
(or ship delivery order) is presented and the goods are delivered the 
delivery is on the terms of the bills of lading (or slip deliveiy)." It 
should also be remembered that this implication does not depend on 
the passing of general or special property, hence the difficulties of 
the 1855 Act do not applyj9 
" Bmndt v Liverpool [I9241 1 K.B 575 
" Tha DomMar~ 119741 1 WL.R341. 
" The ElirZ 113851 1 Lloyd's Rep 107 
* [I9241 1 K.B 575. 
" Todd, Mode~~Bi l l  ofLading, Zndedn., 1990, p. 187 
" Ibid, p. 187. 
4g Ibid, p. 187. 
Among the difficulties in the operation of the 1855 Act are its 
dependence on the passing of property, and its limitation to transfer 
of bills of lading. Other documents such as delivery orders, are not 
covered. The effect of this limitation rs that the Act rarely operates on 
sales of parts of undivided bulk cot~sigpments.~~ Brandt v. Liverpool 
is not subject to any of these limitations." 
The doctrine was applied in The Do7za Marl5? where a cargo of 
tapioca chips had been slipped in hulk under two bills of lading 
which were issued to the consignee. Both bills were clean despite 
the fact that the mate's receipts recorded that the tapioca was damp 
on shipment The consignee then indorsed one of the bills to the 
plaintiff and handed it over together with a ship's delivery order for 
part ofthe reminder of the ca~go.After the plaintiffhad taken delivery 
of his share of the cargo against the production of the documents, 
he subsequently sued the carrier for cargo damage caused by the 
moisture, seeking to rely on the estoppels created by the clean bills. 
Eventhougb he had no rights under the original contract of carriage, 
since property in f ie  goods had been transferred by indorsanent of 
the bill, the trial judge held that he could recover.s3 
The Brandt v. Liverpool doctrine had been partly blocked by 
Binghanam L.J in The Aramis." In that case there was a coinplete 
failure by the carrier to deliver any cargo. Here a quantity of goods 
covered by several bill of lading had been shipped in bulk but, by 
time the final bill was presented by its bolder at the port of discharge, 
the supply of cargo bad been exhausted. The court of Appeal held 
that no contractual relationship between a shipowner and the 
holder of billof lading could he inferred merely from the presentation 
of the bill by the holder to the shipowner, followed by the delivery, 
by the shipowner to the holder, of parts of the goods covered by 
the bill. 
Ibid, p. 188. 
" I b ~ d ,  p 188. 
" Crmer v General Carriers Sd 119731 2 Lloyd's Rep. 366 Facts ofthe case 
taken &om Wilson, op at., p. 149. 
Ibzd. 0.371. 
" [I9891 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213. Facts of theolse taken from Wilson, op nd , p. 150. 
But the decision has been criticized by a number of commentators 
on the grounds that the court were too rigid in applying the 
contractual d e s  on offer, acceptance, consensus ad idem and 
considerations.i5 
Now, however, the Captain Gregas (iVo 2)'6suggestanew willigi~ess 
to find a way t11rougb.i' In that. case the Court of Appeal held that 
on the facts md the evidence a contract was to be implied between 
BP and the shipownem to give business reality to the transaction 
between tbem?%owever, the limitations of this doctrine are 
still unclear.sP 
To make the doctrine operates, however, "it is essential that delivev 
is taken against payment of freight or other outstanding cbarges, since 
the latter provide the consideration necessary to inake the implied 
contract enfor~eable."~~ Presumably in cases where the freight is 
pre-paid and there are no other cbarges outstanding, the indorsee 
will be unable to invoke this pri~cipie.~' The payment of freight (or 
other charges) constitutes the consideration forthe implied contract, 
moving from tbe receiver of the cargo. The consideration moving 
frorn the carrier is delivery of the cargo, on the terms of the bill 
of lading?" 
Altl~ough in all cases in which the doctrine has been successfully 
invoked by a receiver of cargo, he has paid freight or demurrage, 
in principle, there should be no need to find financial consideration, 
so long as some consideration can be found. May be presentation 
of the bill of lading is sufficient consideration for the new cont ra~t .~  
IS Clarke, [I9911 1 LMCLQ 5, p 6-7. See also Beitel, 119891 LMCLQ 162, p. 
1711 - ". 
56 [I9901 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395. Fads af the case taken from Clarke, op at., p. 7 J' Clarke, op nt., p. 6 
58 [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 395, see pp.402-403 per Bin- L I. 
'* W~Ison, op CZL, p 150 See also Todd, M o d m  B~NofLad~ng, 1990, p. 190 
" Wdson, op.ot, p. 150. 
" Ihid., p 150 
" Todd,Modem BIN ofLnding, 1990, pp. 190-191. 
" Ihid, p. 191 
(b) Suing in Tort 
In the Irene k Si*cce8sfi4 itwas held, that where goods are damaged in 
course of transit by the negligence of tlie shipowner, the buyer under 
a c.i.f contract can sue the shipowner in tort. In that case Lloyd J. 
declined to follow The Wear Breeze.65 
3ut in 2%~ .4Z~&non~~ the court rejected the more liberal approach 
of the Ireze's Success. In that case it wa.s a consignment of still ooils 
shipped from Korea to England under a c & f contract. The contract 
was subsequently varied, so that the property in the goods remained 
in the seller until after the goods 11% been discharged. This fact 
meant that die buyer could sue shipowner in contract for the damage 
occurred during tlze voyage due to the negligence stowage. The 
property in thegoods had not passed to the buyer upon or by reason 
of tlie endorsement of the hill of lading. So section 1 of the Bill of 
Ladiig Act did not help him. The buyer then tried to sue in the tort of 
negligence. The court rejected this claim on the ground tliat he was 
not the owner of the steel at the time the damage was inflicted. Lord 
Brandon stated that the decision in The Wear Breeze "was good law 
at the time it was decided and remains good law t~day.'"~ 
Four reason can be disoemed in the decision of the House of Lords.68 
First, there was the same long line of authority going hack to the 
Siinpson v. Thorns~n~~  to which Roskill J. bad referred in the Wear 
Bweze. But none of these cases in the long line of authority, save 
only in the Ek'ear Breeze, concerned a buyer under c.i.f contract.% 
Tlie second reason given by the House of Lords was the familiar 
floodgates argument, otherwise known as dreaded spe~tre.~' 
The third reason is that it would not seem right thatthe consignee, 
by suing in tort, should deprive the shipowner of the protection 
" [I9821 Q,B 481. 
[1%9] 1 Q.B 219. 
" [I9861 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1. 
67 Ib~d,  p. 11. 
bg Lloyd, [I9891 LMCLQ 47.p.54 
69 (1877) 3App 279. 
"O Lloyd, op.at., p. 54. 
7' &d, p 54 
afforded to him by his bill of lading and in particular, of course, any 
defence he might have under the Hague Rules.12 
The fourth season is that the facts of the Aliahnon were special, 
since, by an amendment to the contract, the passing of property was 
postponed until after the goods had been di~charged.~~ 
But, all these reasons have beer strongly criticized by Lloyd in this 
arti~le.:~The presenter is, however, of the view that actions in tort 
should be allowed subject to certain restrictions discussed earlier on. 
The reason being that, first actions in tort in respect of the carriage of 
goods by sea have always been possible in the days of the law as we 
know it now." The first editions of both Carver and Scmtton daied 
1855 and 1886 respectively and of course well before a whisper 
of Donoghue v. Stevenson both make it clear that carriers may be 
liable in tort as well as in contraGt, and subsequent edition have said 
the same in very simiiar wording, though with little explanatio~.'~ 
Secondly, a number of leading cases in Australia, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom have extended the possibility of negligence 
actions, especially in respect of purely financial loss.77 Obvious 
examples are the Caltex Case7'. Thirdly, to disallow sncb actions 
or even to suggest doing so, however, would be to go against inuch 
of the law of bailment: or in a more modern context against the 
principle that persons owe a duty not willfully or negligently to 
harm the person ot property of others.7g Finally Robert Goff L.J's 
view of lilnitingthe scope of the shipowner's duty in tort rather than 
denying its existence is, however, most per~uasive.~~ respect, 
the writer adds, not only persuasive but more just and equitable to 
the innocent injured buyer. 
" Ibid, 0.55. 
Ibid, P.55 
" Ibid, espec~ally pp. 54-55. 
Reynolds, [I9861 LMCLQ 97, p. 97. 
* (bld, p 97. 
7' Ibid, p 97. 
'a (1976) 136 C.L R 529. 
79 Reyuolds, op czt, p 105 
Dav~es, op erf , p. 2. 
(c) Legal Assignment 
Legal assignment may he done in accordance to section 136(1) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925 which requires the assignment to be 
absolute, by writing under the hand of the assignor, and that written 
notice be given to the debt~r .~ '  Legal msignments however, suffer 
from a fundamental defect in a carriage cases since in addition to the 
other documents tire tiryer receives, be needs a written assiyment 
of the carriage rights execute by the sel!~t?~ Thus, the buyer has 
to rely on his seller, who may or may not choose to co-operate in 
assigning his rights. Apart from that it is thought that tnany foreign 
sellers will he unwilling b change their standard sales term simply 
to accommodate a defect in English Furthermore under 
section 136, notice has to he given to the carrier on each assignment, 
meaning in achain of sales that a separate notice is requhd for each 
sale.84 The final buyer may in the end have little idea either who the 
original assignor was or what rights have been assigned.85 
The English Carriage of Goods Act 1992 
(1) Section 2 of the 1992 Act 
The 1992 Act was passed following the reco~mnendations of the 
Commission Report on the Rights of Suit in respect of Cartiage of 
Goods by Sea. 
The 1992 Act solved the problems under 1855 Act in three main 
ways.86 First, by removing the link between the acquisition of the 
contradual rights and the transfer of property which existed in the 
1855 Act. Secondly, by including sea way bills and slup's delivery 
orders within its ambit. Finally, by allowing regulations to he made 
so as to apply the provisions of the Act to paperless transactions 
involving electronic data intercl~ange. 
See Tke Kelo [I9851 2 Lloyd'sRep 85. 
Curwen, [I9921 JBL 245, p. 248. 
8% Law Corn No. 196: Smt. Law Co~n. No. 130 (1991), p 9. 
Ibid,, P 9. 
" I b d ,  p 9. 
86 Jarnes Cooper, Annotations of the Cac~iage of Goads by Sea Act 1992. Lord 
Chancellor Depmkment. 
The Act is expressed to apply to bills of lading, sea waybills and 
ship's delivery o rder~?~  These terms are defined, but the definitions 
are unlikely to cause many surprises. It should be noted, however, 
that a non-negotiable bill of lading Cfor example one which is 
consigned without the words 'lo order' will, for tbe purposes of the 
Act, be treated as a sea waybill since it is non-negotiable document 
and is therefore more akin to a sea waybill than the traditional bill of 
lading." A 'received for shipment' bill of lading is also included in 
the bill of lading definition so that, in appropriate cases, multimodal 
transport documents will be oapable of falling within the scope of 
the Acts9 In relation to delivery orders, the Act is oidy concerned 
with those containing or giving rise to undertakings by the carrier to 
deliver the goods. It is not concerned with merchants' delivery orders 
unless the carrier has 'attorned' and thereby imposed on himself 
an obligation to d e l i ~ e r . ~  The decision to extend the legislation to 
waybills and ship's delivery orders is an extremely important one 
which may well lead to increaseduse of such documents in place of 
bills of lading in a number of trades." 
Section 2(1) is concerned with the transfer of rights under the above 
documents. It provides that (i) a person who becomes the lawful 
holder of the bill of lading and (ii) a person (other than the shipper) 
to whom delivery of goods is to be made under a sea waybill or 
ship's delivery order, 'sball (by virtue of becoming the holder 
of the bill or as the case may be the person to whom delivery is 
to be made) have transferred to and vested in him all rights of 
suit under the contract of carriage as 8 he had been a party to 
that c~ntract '?~ 
In the case of bill of lading the section finally breaks the links 
between the transfer of contractual rights and the acquisition of 
property "upon or by reason of' consignment or indotsement?' 
Bassindale, [I9921 10 nBL414,p 415 
I h d ,  p. 415. 
Ibid., b, 415. 
aid ,  p. 415. 
Ibid., p. 415. 
" Ibid, p.415. 
" Beatson& Coopex, [I9911 2 LMCLQ 196, p. 202. 
Lawful possession of the bill rather than the acquisition of 
property or being on risk, becomes the touchstone of the transfer of 
right of suit.* 
It will be seen that the offending provision of the original Bills 
of Lading Act 1855, under which the transfes of right could only 
occur if property passed 'upon or by reason of the co~~signment or 
endorsement' has gone in its entirety.9s This provision therefore, at 
one stroke removes many of the problems which have arisen in tbe 
past and, in particular, solves the ppvoblems created for bank by the 
decision in Sewell v Bwdick,06 
In the case of sea waybills, the person entitled to sue is stated to he 
the person who, without being an original party of the contract of 
carriage, is entitled to delivery."' It should be noted that right are 
not given to the named consignee simpliciter. Since a sea waybill 
is not a transferable document of title, the shipper will (unless he 
has made contractual provision otherwise) retain rights of disposal 
over the goods until the time of d e l i v e ~ ? ~ ~  If right were given to 
the named consignee as from the time of consignment, this would 
prevent the shipper from exercising his rights of disposal in favour 
of new consignee.993 Thus, in the case of sea waybill, section 2 (1) 
(b) gives rights to the person entitled to delivery, which means 
the named consignee or such other person to whom the carrier is 
directed to deliver. 
In some sense, this provision on its own would be almost too far 
reaching. It would have allowed parties to go on transferring a bill 
of lading long after delivery of the goods, so that transferees would 
acquire rights against the carrier in respect of goods over which they 
had never had an i~terest.'~" This would have been tantamount to 
trading in litigation claims, which was felt to be unde~irable.'~'~ 
Seetion 2(2), therefore, provides that where the bill of lading 
" Ib~d ,  p. 302. 
Basshdale, ,qp.cil, p. 415. 
96 Ibd, p. 415. 
" Beaison & Cooper, op at., p 203 
q8 Ihrd, p. 203 
9 ' 1616, p. 202. 
'" 'Basslodak, op.ezft p. 415. 
1017fizd, p 415. 
passes to a transferee &r discharge, he will acquire no right 
unless he becomes the holder pursuant to a pre-existing contractual 
arrangement (for example a prior sale contract). 
Given that section 2(1) speaks of the trmfer of rights under the 
contract of carriage, section 2(3) ensure that the riglrt of snit of the 
person entitled to delivery under tile terms of sbip's delive~y order 
are confined to the goods covered by the order and do not extend to 
the other goods covered by the underlyingcontract of ~arriage. '~ 
In some cases, the party who acquires the ultimate right of suit under 
these new provision will not be the person who has actually suffered 
the Ios~.'"~ Section 2(4) therefore provides that, in such cases, he 
will be able to exercise his newly acquired rights of suit for the 
benefit of the person who has. The Act does not, however, address 
the problem of what is to happen if the holder is not prepared to do 
so, and this will presumably have to be sorted out in the underlying 
sale eontracts, or on an ad hoc basis when problems arise.1048 
Section 2(5) (a) provides that the bill of lading shipper loses rights 
of suit when someone else (such as asubsequent indorsee of the bill 
of lading) acquires them. This follows the position under the bill of 
lading Act 1855. Where sellers remain on risk beyond the normal 
time in documentary sales, they can make special contract to protect 
them~elves.'"~ Eurthermore, the shipper can seek a reindorse~nent 
of the bill of lading in those cases where he needs rights of suit 
he will in such cases, be able to sue qua lawful holder of the 
bill of lading.lo610 
Section 2C5) @) provides that those intermediately entitled to 
delivery under bills of lading, sea waybills and ship's delivery 
orders lose rights of suit when others acquired them. Again, this 
follow, in the case of bills of lading, the position under the 1855 Act, 
whereby previous holders of bills of lading lost their rights of suit 
when there were transfemd in the way stipulated by section 1 of the 
" Beaisan & Cooper, op cif , p. 204. 
Bassindale, op cif , p. 416. 
"b81bd. p. 416 
'0S9 James Cooper, op a t ,  p 50-6. 
Iaibid, p. 50-6. 
Act1o7n Tlle intermediate seller in chain who remains on risk aftw 
indorsement can arrange an assignment ofthe buyer's rights against 
the 
The Act does not attempt to change the law relating to claims in tort; 
no does it seek to regulate charter party contract The law relating 
to the interrelation between bills of lading and charter parties 
therefore remains ~naffected."'~'~ One consequence of extending the 
cargo receivers' right to sue, hut not restricting the possibility of 
claims in tort under the charter party may be to increase the risk 
of more than one claim being brought against the canier in respect 
of the same loss."014 This was a poiat which the Commission did 
consider but they conclude that this was a problem which had not 
caused difficulty under the old law (where dual claims were also 
permissible) and that the courts would not allow the carrier to be 
liable twice over. Accordingly they concluded that the problem was 
apparent than real.""' 
The other point should be noted concerning charter party is, where 
a hill of lading is issued to the shipper and is thence indorsed to 
the charte~er/indorsee's. rights against the shipowner stem from the 
charter party or the bill of l ad i~g '?~ '~ '~  The answer is not addressed 
explicitly in the new Act, nor was it under the Bills of Lading Act 
1855."317 
Finally, what is the position where a person who is entitled to 
delivery of the bill of lading never receives it (say, because it is 
lost) or receives it only after expiry of one-year limitation period in 
the Hague-Visby This question remains a matter which 
may require resolution from the courts. In these circumstances, 
recovery may be denied under the Recourse to an implied 
io'B"' Ibid., p. 50-6. 
" Ibid., p. 50-6. 
'" Bassindale, op.cif., p. 416. 
Iw Ibid, p. 416. 
"' "lhid,  p. 416. 
'" " James.Cooper. op.ci(., p. 50-5. 
I" "Zbid., p. 50-5. 
1" '" Ihid, p. 58-5. 
"j l9 Ibid, p. 50-5. 
contract between the buyer and the ca~rier on the tenns of the bill of 
lading, a so-called Brundt v. Liverpool contract, remains one way of 
circumventing problems which are not solved by the 
Even though, there are a nunber of questions have still not been 
solved by the 1992 Act, yet the new English Act is much better than 
the 1855 Act. In the wo~dq of one comrnentat~r:"~~' 
"We believe that the end result will be an all mund 
improvement. It will be good for the trades and t h e i ~  
imurcrs, who will be able to assert righfs against 
sea carriers without any technical restpictiom such 
as showing that property passed in a parficular way 
or that they were on risk. It will be good far liner 
shipoumers, by reason ofthe fhct that the refonn puts 
sea u~aybills andE.D.1 on a sfaiutoryfoofing Indeed, it 
will be to the benefit of all sea carriers ... it reduces bhe 
needfor crargo interests to seek redress by action in tort 
or bazlment, with theirpotentially much wider m b i t  ... 
the new reform, in extending the contracfwl regime, 
should corresponuhgly reduce the need for parhes 
to rely on tort, bailment and the Brmdf v. Live~pool 
devzce. It is thus to be welcomed in the interest of 
o~nmercial certainty.'" 
Conclusion 
By virtue of section 5 of Civil Law Act 1956, any statute relating 
to carriage of goods by sea passed in England after 7 April 1956 is 
inapplicabIeinMalaysia. Thus, it is argued that The English Carriage 
of Goods Act 1992 is not enforceable in Malaysia. Hence, after 19 
September 1992, Malaysia still applies the Bill of Lading Act 1855. 
It is, therefore, suggested that any amendment to the law of carriage 
of goods by sea should take into account the aspect relating to the 
right to sue under the contract of affreightment. 
'I6 I b ~ d ,  p. 50-5. 
"' " Beatson & Cooper, oy.nt, p 208. 
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